Technological University Dublin

ARROW@TU Dublin
Articles
2022-8

A Physical Layer Security (PLS) approach through Address Fed
Mapping Crest Factor Reduction applicable for 5G/6G signals
Somayeh Mohammady
Technological University Dublin, somayeh.mohammady@tudublin.ie

David Malone Prof.
National University of Ireland, Maynooth, david.malone@mu.ie

Follow this and additional works at: https://arrow.tudublin.ie/creaart
Part of the Electrical and Computer Engineering Commons

Recommended Citation
S. Mohammady and D. Malone, "A Physical Layer Security (PLS) approach through Address Fed Mapping
Crest Factor Reduction applicable for 5G/6G signals," 2022 9th International Conference on Future
Internet of Things and Cloud (FiCloud), 2022, pp. 282-288, doi: 10.1109/FiCloud57274.2022.00047.

This Conference Paper is brought to you for free and
open access by ARROW@TU Dublin. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of
ARROW@TU Dublin. For more information, please
contact arrow.admin@tudublin.ie,
aisling.coyne@tudublin.ie, gerard.connolly@tudublin.ie.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 4.0 License
Funder: Science Foundation Ireland

2022 9th International Conference on Future Internet of Things and Cloud (FiCloud)

A Physical Layer Security (PLS) approach through
Address Fed Mapping Crest Factor Reduction
applicable for 5G/6G signals
∗

Somayeh Mohammady∗ , David Malone†
School of Electrical & Electronic Engineering, Technological University Dublin (TU Dublin), Ireland
† Hamilton Institute/Department of Maths and Stats, Maynooth University, Kildare, Ireland
E-mail: somayeh.mohammady@tudublin.ie, david.malone@mu.ie

Abstract—The privacy and security of 5G/6G infrastructures
are receiving great attention together with power consumption
and efﬁciency. Here, Physical Layer Security (PLS) is considered
and a technique named Address Fed Mapping (AFM) is proposed
which not only enhances the physical layer security, but also
reduces the effect of high Peak to Average Power Ratio (PAPR),
which results in efﬁciency improvement in OFDM based signals
used in beyond 5G and 6G [1]. The AFM is designed based on the
idea of randomly generated signals, modifying the original signal
to reduce PAPR. Instead of a typical randomization algorithm, a
unique key is generated based on Channel response that is known
only transmitter-receiver pairs. This key is used to pick a signal
and send it. It is shown that the proposed AFM technique reduces
PAPR, which improves the energy efﬁciency of the system.
Index Terms—Channel response, CFR, PAPR, Physical layer
Security, PLS, 5G and 6G
Fig. 1. Coherent Channel Response detection diagram

I. I NTRODUCTION

Beyond 5G systems are expected to carry a variety of important trafﬁc, including network control trafﬁc, so it is important
to provide secured transmission in order to prevent attacks on
user, control and management trafﬁc [2]. As discussed by the
technical report released by the UK Department for Digital,
Culture, Media and Sport of the United Kingdom government
[3], 5G architectures should consider the principles of Crosslayer security, End-to-end security, Cross-domain security and
Secure-by-design, as well as layer functions such as cell
search [4]. Moreover, any modiﬁcation added to the Physical
layer or MAC layer, such as rotating the OFDM symbols
or machine learning approaches on MAC layer, should be
feasible and practical in terms of complexity and cost [5].
This is the main motivation behind designing AFM algorithm
as it targets two points: improving the power efﬁciency by
reducing the peak to average ratio and enhancing the security
by making use of a parameter that is naturally random and
available to use. This parameter, Channel Response [6], [7],
looks at natural characteristics, such as time variability, and

short time reciprocity [3] associated with the wireless communication medium. Designers often try to compensate for
these characteristics by cancelling them, in order to enhance
the connection. This means that the effect of he channel is
treated as a distortion or noise. However, from security point
of view, these natural characteristic can be used as temporary
keys to protect the connection, which continuously changes
naturally with no way of predicting by other unauthorized
parties. Many works using Channel State Information (CSI)
as a key to encrypt the signal [8], [9]. It has the beneﬁt of
being random by nature, and being known by the transmitter
and receiver that have carried out the process of pairing. A
typical example of a connection is presented in Fig. 1. Emily
and Jack have to initialize a connection by sending training
sequence, and then the channel characteristics will be known.
In this paper, it is assumed that the connection between
Emily and Jack has been initialized, meaning that the channel
response is known by both and the aim is that the connection
stays secure. Our test set up is illustrated in Fig. 2, and
Fig. 3, where a Chirp pulse is transmitted within 1 meter
distance, and the channel response is measured with an FPGA
evaluation boards as shown (details in [10], [11]).

Thanks Prasidh Ramabadram for help during the measurements and hardware tests. This publication has emanated from research conducted while
working under the supervision of Prof. Ronan Farrell and Dr. John Dooley
at Maynooth University and supported by the Science Foundation Ireland
Research Centre for Future Networks and Communications (CONNECT).

B. Efﬁciency and Peak to Average Power Ratio (PAPR)
An important aspect of any OFDM based technology, e.g.
5G and 6G mobile systems, is power efﬁcient transmitters. In

A. Security and Channel Response
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Fig. 2. Test Set up for capturing Channel Response

Fig. 4. CCDF, Probability of PAPR for different IFFT Length Signals
PAPR
Efﬁciency η
11.636 dB
13.10%
11.84 dB
12.79%
12.061 dB
12.47%
12.401 dB
11.99%
12.503 dB
11.85%
12.61 dB
11.71%
TABLE I
BANDWIDTH , IFFT L ENGTH OF LTE SIGNAL , AND CORRESPONDING
PAPR ( D B)

Bandwidth
1.4 MHz
3 MHz
5 MHz
10 MHz
15 MHz
20 MHz

Fig. 3. Lab test Set up picture for capturing Channel Response

order to support the range of applications intended for beyond
5G, such as high speed enhanced Mobile Broadband(eMBB)
[12], massive Machine-Type Communications (mMTC) [13],
Augmented Reality and Virtual Reality AR/VR media, and
Ultra-Reliable Low-Latency Communication (URLLC) [14],
optimizing the transmitted power at the ampliﬁcation stage is
a major challenge [15]. However designing Radio Frequency
(RF) components capable of that capacity is challenging when
power consumption and efﬁciency is considered. The RF
Power Ampliﬁer (PA) is normally the component that dominates overall system power consumption [16]. Power efﬁciency
of the PA can be degraded by properties of the ampliﬁed
signal including Peak to Average power Ratio (PAPR) [17]–
[19], which increases with bandwidth and length of Inverse
Fast Fourier Transform (IFFT) [20]. A waveform that exhibits
high PAPR degrades PA efﬁciency and linearity [14], [21]. As
a logarithmic parameter, PAPR is a ratio between maximum
power of the signal and average power,


Maximum Power
.
(1)
P AP RdB = 10 log10
Average Power

length. 5G signals are expected to have bandwidth of between
50–400 MHz, so it is clear that the PAPR becomes more
important than ever. This can be also observed from Fig. 5,
which presents plots showing measured PAPR and a a linear
model. By assuming BW = 50M Hz, the the linear model
will be 15.3dB. Equally, for an IFFT length of 8192, the PAPR
would be 15.7dB. The direct effect of high PAPR is on PA
efﬁciency, but here this concern is addressed together with the
security of transmission.
The energy efﬁciency η is used in power analysis when
designing transmission systems. A signiﬁcant portion of power
is wasted as heat in PAs and bulky heat sinks are often used
to manage the heat [24], [25]. High efﬁciency systems should
maximise the power of the output signal relative to input signal
[26], which can be captured by optimising η
η=

As the occurrence of high PAPR depends on the signal, the
probability of PAPR is considered [22]. This probability is
measured with Complementary Cumulative Distribute Function (CCDF).
CCDF = P (P AP RdB > P AP RT hreshold ) .

IFFT Length
128
256
512
1024
2048
2048

POutput
,
PInput

(2)

A typical LTE (4G) signal with Bandwidth of 20MHz and
IFFT length of 2048, has about 12.6dB PAPR at CCDF of
10−4 , meaning that the probability of occurrence of 12.6dB
PAPR is about 0.1% for this signal (c.f. Fig. 4).
Fig. 4 presents CCDF plot for PAPR of OFDM signals with
various IFFT lengths. Observe that as IFFT length increases,
PAPR increases [23]. Tab. I shows this in another way,
showing that PAPR increases with increase in bandwidth/IFFT

Fig. 5. PAPR value vs. Length of IFFT/Bandwidth in OFDM Signal
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(3)

Fig. 7. The AFM block diagram

Fig. 6. Efﬁciency (η) vs. PAPR (dB)

where POutput is the power for output signal, and PInput ,
is the power for input signal. Note that η typically behaves
exponentially with values of PAPR in dB,
η(P AP R) = η0 10

−P AP R
20

.

(4)

If P AP R = 0, η = η0 which is the initial energy efﬁciency
of PA. Here we use the assumption that η0 is 50% [26], [27].
With this, energy efﬁciency can be calculated (see Tab. I and
Fig. 6). By assuming P AP R = 15.3dB, we see η drops to
8.59%, which is undesirable.
There are works targeting both PAPR reduction and security. For example, in [9], the Selected Mapping (SLM)
[28] technique is used to encrypt the signal. However, when
generating ransom phases for the SLM technique [29], there is
a chance that the original signal, which has no phase rotation,
has minimum PAPR, and is selected to be sent [30]. From
security point of view, the signal can be revealed. Moreover,
the receiver has to be informed about the SLM selection for
every single transmission. This information, known as side
information [31], usually consist of few bits, however, they
are crucial key to reveal the signal, and channel security for
these bits are necessary.
In this paper, a new algorithm is developed in order to
enhance the security through a system that reduces the PAPR
of a signal prior passing through PA. The new algorithm,
Address Fed Mapping (AFM), is shown to be a feasible
solution to target both security and PAPR of transmitter and
it is capable of processing 4G and 5G signals.

Fig. 8. Shifting, and Selection process in Seed Generation

deep drop on the left of Fig. 7 joins more smoothly to the
right. The shifted process, which rearranges zero frequency
components in correct order, can be used to generate keys.
The next step in our scheme is selection, which means that
the usable area of the the plot is selected, as shown in Fig. 8.
The selection process is used to avoid ﬂat responses, as when
quantized a ﬂat response will produce similar values, which
is not desirable for randomization. The quantization process
can be easily implemented in simulation by normalizing the
values, and slicing the values, and so producing the seed. The
process of repeating the seed is performed in order to ensure
that the length of the input signal matches the length of the
seed that is being produced. The effect of repeating can be
also seen in Fig. 9. This seed is then used for mutation as
seen in middle section of the block diagram Fig. 7.
B. Mutation Process
This part of the algorithm is inspired by the SLM approach,
[28], and also indirectly from Genetic Algorithms. In the
SLM technique, there are copies of the original sequence and

II. A DDRESS F ED M APPING (AFM)
As mentioned before, the initial idea is to use the channel
response as a key. The beneﬁt, as mentioned earlier, is that
the key is known by transmitter and receiver. The nature
of the channel response makes it a suitable key. The ﬁrst
block in main block diagram presented in Fig. 7, indicated
by Seed Generation shows four steps of Shifting, Selection,
Quantization, and Repeating.
A. Seed Generation
As seen in Fig. 7, the channel response has a drop in the
middle, which is due to DC offset. When this data is shifted,
the channel response usage is more efﬁcient, meaning that the

Fig. 9. Candidate Signal vs Seed
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Fig. 10. ASCII Converter Algorithm

Fig. 12. AFM receiver block diagram

Fig. 11. Comparison of Candidate Signal 1 vs Seed 1
Fig. 13. OFDM signal indicating data free sub carriers

multiplications modify them in order to ﬁnd the best sequence
in terms of PAPR value. Here the seed that was generated by
the previous section is fed to this mutation process inspired
by Genetic algorithm. The seed is copied M times (in this
paper, M = 8), and mutated. This mutation is performed by
American Standard Code for Information Interchange (ASCII)
[32] algorithm, as instead of the usual multiplication, here
there are 8 complex additions, and instead of phase rotation,
ASCII algorithm is used in order to form an encoding process.
The initial assumption behind the design of the proposed
AFM technique, is that the seed is known by transmitter, and
receiver, therefore, in order to have multiple versions of the
seed which means multiple addresses for picking up values
from the designed cushion signal, as shown in Fig. 10, ASCII
algorithm is used to generate unique identiﬁcation for each
address. This encodes the message in a unique manner that
only receiver would be able to decode.
The main idea behind using ASCII algorithm here is to
give each sequence an identity that can be easily extracted by
the receiver. It should be noted that this part does not require
signiﬁcant security, as the addresses sequence is secured, and
the seed that generates each address is also secured, so the
main purpose of the design is to have clear identiﬁcation. This
process will enhance the security of the signal, and informs the
receiver about the selection on transmitter side by this identity.
The process of ASCII is shown in Fig. 7.
The idea of using ASCII algorithm is also inspired by
some works that suggest the use of a pattern in SLM, in
order to avoid side information [18], [33]. Here the idea helps
the AFM algorithm to be enhanced and also does not need
transmission of extra bits with highly secure channel. The
effect of mutation can be seen by red color variation around

the blue plots in Fig. 11 and Fig. 9. It should be noted that
the sequence generated for identifying the selected signal is
a result of the addition of ASCII bits and the seed generated
from the channel response. This pattern should be stored at
the receiver, and when receiving the encrypted signal, having
both the pattern and channel response, the receiver is able to
extract the original signal. This is only possible for the paired
receiver. The process of extracting original signal by using the
known channel response, and the key to reversing the ASCII
algorithm is shown in Fig. 12. Note that the key for ASCII
does not require signiﬁcant security, since it only addresses
the sequence generated based on Cushion signal, and the seed
originated from channel response.
However, ensuring that correct address is sent to the receiver
it crucial. Here it is recommended to send the address indicating the selection only for PAPR section, to the receiver using
data-free sub-carriers in OFDM signal frame. An example plot
is shown in Fig. 13, which shows that according to IEEE
standard [34], from 256 sub-carriers in OFDM frame, 201 subcarriers carry data, and 55 of them are known to be data-free
sub-carriers, and they are designed to ensure space between
channels. At the receiver, this section will be discarded after
receiving the signal [30]. The idea is to make use of this space
inspired by some of previous works [18], [33], as not all the
space is required for transmitting the information for PAPR
selection, but the beneﬁt is that this band is secured together
with the same data carrying sub-carriers, so there is no need for
extra security. Where the data-free sub-carriers are discarded
at the receiver, they are in fact recycled and the information
for PAPR and the division for reverse process as shown in
Fig. 12 is operated, and the signal can be securely extracted.
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Fig. 15. Phase rotations based on SLM based techniques

Fig. 14. Cushion Signal, and AFM selection path

C. Cushion Signal Generation
The main idea behind the Cushion shape signal is to
seal the modulation scheme, as circle, square, or rectangle
might categorize the probability of using QAM, QPSK, or
OQPSK, and BPSK schemes. However, in this paper the
cushion signal is purely used to generate completely random
phase rotations with fed address that are only recognizable
with receiver, resulting in enhancement of the security, and
moreover reduction in PAPR. It should be noted the proposed
technique is applied to the signal after modulation, not instead
of modulation, therefore, the constellations are assumed to be
changed and it is important to reverse the process as shown in
Fig. 12, right after receiving the signal at the receiver side
and before demodulation process, in order to have correct
constellation detection. When comparing the path indicated by
yellow lines in Fig. 14, and the path in both cases of QPSK,
and OPSK in Fig. 15, it can be observed that the path that
the randomization takes is lot more predictable in SLM-based
approaches. In contrast, the path that randomization presented
in cushion signal, as shown in Fig. 15, indicates that the only
way of extracting the correct path is by having the key that
is generated by the common channel response. The idea of
sealing the modulation scheme by using the cushion signal
(detailed below) can be explored further in future works. It
should be noted that it is assumed that the cushion signal is
known by the paired transmitter, and receiver.
As shown in Fig. 12, once the address is generated by the
seed it is used to pick up a value from the cushion. The cushion
signal is generated using
C = a + ib,

Fig. 16. Example of Cushion Signal with N um = 100, and r = 0.2

indicates the quantity of varied phases, calculated by (N um−
1)/2, and N um should be same length as the input signal. In
this paper the LTE toolbox is used to generate the input signal,
N um = 30720. An example when r = 0.2, and N um = 100
is presented in Fig. 16.
From the Cartesian point of view, the cordinates, (x, y), of
each point on Fig. 17 are selected by further randomization as
x and y are generated randomly as:
x = (random values between -1 and 1) × sh
y = (random values between -1 and 1) × sh

where sh is the size of the center point, shown by a hole
in Fig. 17. It should be noted that the range of (−1) and
(+1) are selected on purpose in order to avoid additional
peaks in signal, and covering all possible points generated
by any mentioned type of modulation scheme. It should be
also noted that, for this work in most of the cases, and in
most of results presented in this paper, sh = 0.3, which
means that there is no hole, and random values are allowed
to cross zero as shown in Fig. 16 and Fig. 14. However
in some cases, for example in out-phasing power ampliﬁers
(PAs), when the bandwidth is expanded and distortion around
the main spectrum is experienced which is due to the signal
being close to zero, sh can be increased which means that
zero crossing can be avoided which is shown in Fig. 17. This
will result in distortion reduction caused by out-phased signals
[35], however here this case is not the concerned.

(5)

where a and b are the real and imaginary parts of signal and
can be determined using
a = r cos θa + βa
b = r cos θb + βb

(7)

(6)

where r is the radius for our cushion signal, and here r = 0.3,
the angle θ varies from 0 to 2π, with step size of π/α. α
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Fig. 17. Cushion Signal when sh is varied

Fig. 19. CCDF plot for PAPR reduction effect of AFM technique

Fig. 18. AFM technique block diagram

III. P ERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
We tested the AFM technique with more than 105 OFDMbased signals. CCDF results are presented in Fig. 19. Observe
that as seen in Fig. 4, the original OFDM signal presents
about 12.5dB PAPR at CCDF of 0.0001. By applying the
proposed AFM technique, this value is reduced to 10.5dB,
10.3dB, 10.3dB, 9.8dB, and 5.7dB, at a comparable point
of CCDF = 0.0001. From eq. 4, the energy efﬁciency is
consequently improved from 12.79% to 14.93%, when the
IFFT length is 256, and only one additional phase from AFM
technique is added. Tab. II presents more results achieved
based on AFM, and calculation of efﬁciency based on PAPR.
To obtain the results in Fig. 4, the efﬁciency improvement
is obtained by subtracting the achieved efﬁciency from the
efﬁciency obtained from Eq. 4 using PAPR values without the
AFM technique applied. Note that there are two selection when
it comes to choosing the sequence with minimum PAPR, and
the information indicating the selected sequence in this case
would be f irst, or second, and in binary format it would
be 01100110, for f , 01101001 for i, 01110010 for r, and
so on. Another way of employing this idea would be to do
it in numeric format, as 1st represented by 00000001, and
2nd with 00000010. However, note that the chance that in
IFFT
Length
256
512
1024
2048

Fig. 20. Comparison of scatter-plots before and after AFM technique

numeric format, any mistake in one bit only leads to failure
in extracting the information at the receiver, the binary using
letters is recommended. Moreover, a common understanding
should be established at the beginning of connection between
the transmitter, and the receiver, in order to agree to use capital
letters, or small letters. For example 01100001 represents a,
and 01000001 represents A, therefore, any confusion must be
avoided.
As channel frequency response varies at each pairing, it is
possible to use it as a factor to secure transmission. Here the
source of the technique relies on this channel response, then
as explained earlier, it is processed and a unique sequence is
generated. The signal’s scatter-plot with and without the AFM
technique is compared in Fig. 20.
As seen in Fig. 20, the scatter-plot of the original signal
indicated by blue color, varies from the processed signal
indicated by red color. This indicates that only the paired
receiver that has access to the exact same channel response,
and exact same ASCII pattern, and exact same cushion signal
can extract the signal.

PAPRAFM
at 10−4 CCDF
11.84 dB
12.061 dB
12.401 dB
12.503 dB

Achieved Efﬁciency
Efﬁciency η Improvement
12.79%
12.47%
11.99%
11.85%
TABLE II
E NERGY E FFICIENCY IMPROVEMENT BY APPLYING AFM TECHNIQUE
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IV. C ONCLUSION
This paper introduces a technique for enhancing security
at the physical layer for beyond 5G and 6G signals, and
simultaneously reduces the PAPR of the signal and leads to
improved power efﬁciency. The proposed methods are explained and simulation results show 3dB reduction in PAPR at
CCDF of 10−4 , resulting directly in an improvement in energy
efﬁciency, and enhancement in the security from physical layer
point of view. The idea blends the natural randomization of
channel response with phase rotations based on this randomization, which also reduces PAPR. This technique has potential
to be applied to completely seal the modulation scheme which
can be explored in future work. Furthermore, It would be
interesting to study the practicality of guessing attacks on
either the channel, seed or key in the future.
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